negotiate trade agreements is a little like using the Third Fleet to achieve adjustments to NAFTA� Frankly, that is exactly what French sees as the future role of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), once the PLAN's growing size helps to reduce U�S� influence in China's sphere� French's most significant observationunique among similar books-is that the American-centric nature of most assessments of the PRC's rise blinds us to the fact that most Chinese do not regard the United States as its primary, long-term enemy� Rather, Japan is perceived as the once-and-future foe that deserves the most retribution for China's "century of humiliation� " French illustrates the popularity of this mainland view by examining the composition of the PRC's entertainment media� " [T] o turn on the television in China is to be inundated with war themed movies, which overwhelmingly focus on Japanese villainy� More than two hundred anti-Japanese films were produced in 2012 alone, with one scholar estimating that 70 percent of Chinese TV dramas involve Japan-related war plots" (p� 21)� Thus, in French's estimate, it would not be tension over islands (some of them false) in the South China Sea that would result in inadvertent war, but rather an escalating dispute over the Senkakus� French has done an excellent job of identifying the ties between dynastic China's open tian xia policies and PRC president Xi Jinping's aspirations for the future� French points out the ironic similarities between Xi's rhetoric and that of the Chinese communists' greatest enemy, Chiang Kai-shek, over the rightful dominance of China in Asia� Their desired rules for international politics resemble those represented in Thucydides's Melian Dialogue� French recounts that when a Singaporean deputy expressed support for a maritime code of conduct at a recent multilateral conference, Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi responded, "China is a big country and other countries are small countries � � � and that's just a fact" (p� 126)� Everything under the Heavens is both an informative book and an enjoyable read� One hopes it will make the overly optimistic think a little bit harder about future relations between China and the rest of the world� However, in the end, French-whether by personal nature or intellectual predilection-feels compelled to offer only optimistic recommendations� "A China that is treated as an equal with much to contribute to human betterment, " he writes, "but met with understated but resolute firmness when need be, is a China that will mellow as it advances in the decades ahead, and then most likely plateau" (p� 284)� Of course, how to be both understated and resolute in an increasingly shrill world is the unanswered dilemma� The problem with hugging (or scolding) the panda is that it bites� This journey takes the reader beyond the obvious historical causes and looks at the underlying reasons for the blunders in operational and strategic decisionmaking� Compared with other books written about the German and British campaigns in Norway, this dissection of the "anatomy" of a campaign is more applicable to military campaigns today� Kiszely looks into the structural functions of the campaign and how they related to each other to find out what did and did not work� Since the military campaign links the political objective to military ways and means, he claims the outcome of the campaign was a giveneven before the first shot� The book is valuable because the lessons from the Norwegian campaign demonstrate the relations between strategy and policy and the effect on the operational and tactical levels� Modern campaigns build on experience from the past, and readers will appreciate this honest dissection as the author shares his own insight from joint strategic military and operational experience� Kiszely is a retired, highly decorated British officer and a soldier with operational command experience in national and international operations, as well as service on the Joint Staff�
The author examines the challenges that Great Britain faced in the transition from peace to war� How does a country move from a peacetime organization and optimize the ways and means to achieve strategic ends? His insight into British decision-making and the relationship between military leaders and their political masters is an outstanding assessment of a strategy-policy mismatch and shows how a service-oriented approach to a military campaign utterly fails� Modern, theater-level campaigns are orchestrated at the operational level to synchronize joint-service contributions� Kiszely claims that unique, British, service-oriented leadership contributed to a disconnect between strategic-and tactical-level objectives� British military culture at that time was founded on superior improvisation and ad hoc adaptation� Services conducted separate operations driven by German military initiatives, and those operations sometimes were counterproductive to the theater campaign� Today's commanders should not overlook the lessons that his insight provides�
The author makes a convincing argument that understanding expeditionary operations and campaigns is vital to managing the strategic and grand strategic environments� On the grand strategic level, the British struggled to formulate common political objectives with its allies, which had a direct effect on the conduct of the campaign� Domestic politics influenced the national decision-making, and the need to do something haunted the Allied coalition� Even as the security situation obviously required the Allies to build up forces on the continent to meet the threat from Germany, forces were diverted to a secondary front in Norway, for which they were not prepared� Those directing multinational operations need to consider how to build political and military unity into a campaign� According to Kiszely, the Allies and Germany approached strategy and policy very differently because of their opposing political orientations: a democratic coalition on the one hand and an authoritarian regime on the other� The German decision-making in this phase of the war had strategic advantages, as its policy and campaign plans were synchronized, whereas the Allied coalition was not able to adapt to the operational tempo and unite around a coherent grand strategy� 2 Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 13 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/13
Kiszely provides a convincing argument that the foundation for German success was theater-level strategy and management of the campaign� Even though the Allies had local successes, as demonstrated in the battle of Narvik, their tactical achievements were not embedded in a grand strategy or theater-level objective for winning the campaign�
In conclusion, Kiszely claims that the campaign in Norway was a decisive victory for the Germans, in that they achieved strategic surprise and dominating airpower� The main reason for the British campaign failure is found in the link between policy and plans� The ends were not supported by available means and ways, and policy became divorced from reality� Such determinations leave the reader to evaluate and decide where the responsibility for the failure of the campaign lies� Odd Arne Westad has taken on a difficult task: providing a one-volume history of the Cold War� The U�S�-Soviet confrontation lasted over four decades and had many episodes� Cramming the entire story into one book-even one that is over seven hundred pages longis no simple thing� Westad made his task even harder by taking an international focus and starting his coverage in the 1890s, with the politicization of the confrontation between labor and capital� However, Westad is certainly up to the task� He is something of a transnational man� Although Norwegian, he holds a PhD from a U�S� school (the University of North Carolina) and has taught in both the United Kingdom and the United States� This book is the product of research in archives around the planet (Bulgaria, Egypt, India, Russia, South Africa, and the United States) and the reading of other source material published in German, French, Chinese, and Norwegian� An important advantage to this book is that it is an easy read, which is crucial, given its length� It is easy for historians to get trapped in the details of their research and skimp on their analysis and writing� That is not the case here� Westad covers events in a compelling but concise manner� At times, though, the reader might wish that he had provided more documentation of his arguments, since his footnotes often do not show from where his evidence came�
The chapter on the ideological elements of the confrontation before the 1940s is less than convincing, but fortunately short� Westad sustains these arguments better in the body of the text� In World War II, capitalism and communism worked together not because of the Nazi threat but only because of the Germans� "Some form of postwar conflict was next to inevitable" (p� 68)� Joseph Stalin was a brutal dictator, but he also was indecisive and let European affairs drift, while the United States acted� As a result, Washington had more to do with turning the postwar confrontation into a sustained Cold War than did Moscow� One of the central arguments of this book is that the Cold War was about more than the United States and the Soviet Union� On this point, Westad is certainly correct; the question is one of emphasis� He gives a good deal of
